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THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL RESOURCES
PROTECTION ACT: A NEW
APPLICATION IN THE PRIVATE
PROPERTY CONTEXT
Archaeological' looting and trafficking is a lucrative and thriving
business in the United States with a growing international market
for Native American2 artifacts. 3  Commercial looters and "pothunt-
1. For purposes of this Comment, archaeology refers to "techniques for recovering
the physical evidence of past human societies" and relates to "a body of theory which
guides the interpretation of this evidence." Paul R. Fish, Federal Policy and Legislation for
Archaeological Conservation, 22 ARIz. L. REv. 681, 681 (1980).
2. Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-95, 93 Stat. 721
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm (1988)), refers to Native Americans as
"Indians" throughout the text of the Act; therefore, Native Americans may be referred to
as "Indians" in the context of the statute.
3. Native American artifacts may be characterized as archaeological resources. An
archaeological resource is "any material remains of past human life or activities which are
of archaeological interest." 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(1) (1988). More specifically, the Archaeo-
logical Resources Protection Act lists archaeological resources as including, but not limited
to, "pottery, basketry, bottles, weapons, weapon projectiles, tools, structures or portions of
structures, pit houses, rock paintings, rock carvings, intaglios, graves, human skeletal
materials, or any portion or piece of any of the foregoing items." Id
The value of archaeological resources in the United States is immense. For example, in
each instance when a Native American artifact is excavated from a site without initially
being scrutinized by an anthropologist or archaeologist in its original environment, the
historical and scientific value of a piece may be ruined. See Jonathan S. Moore, Note,
Enforcing Foreign Ownership Claims in the Antiquities Market, 97 YALE L.J. 466, 466
(1988). The examination of artifacts in the" '[c]ontext' " in which they are found is equally
important as the examination of artifacts in isolation. See Fish, supra note 1, at 683.
Archaeologists study artifacts to gain information concerning past human life and in
some instances to see how the natives of North America lived. Lorrie D. Northey, The
Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979: Protecting Prehistory for the Future, 6
HARV. EN rL. L. REV. 61, 62 (1982); see Fish, supra note 1, at 681. An archaeological site
may be extremely relevant to Native Americans who have both cultural and ancestral ties
to a place, particularly to Native American human remains found within the area. See
generally Margaret B. Bowman, The Reburial of Native American Skeletal Remains: Ap-
proaches to the Resolution of a Conflict, 13 HARV. ErivL. L. Rnv. 147 (1989) (discussing
the debate between Native Americans and scientists with respect to the reburial of Native
American remains). In many instances, the looting of a religious site potentially can
threaten an entire way of life for a Native American tribe. Derek V. Goodwin, Raiders of
the Sacred Sites, N.Y. TuMEs MAG., Dec. 7, 1986, at 65,86. For instance, in 1979 when Hopi
spiritual leaders discovered that their sacred masks had been stolen, their method of wor-
shipping was threatened. Id. As one tribal leader put it,"[w]ithout our religion, we die."
Id
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ers"4 are renowned for unearthing burial grounds and bulldozing ruins
with large-scale, mechanical equipment5 to supply an extraordinarily lu-
crative black market with aboriginal artifacts.6 By 1979, archaeological
looters had pillaged successfully nearly 3,000 recorded ancient sites on
national forest lands in Arizona.7 Between 1980 and 1987, looting on pri-
vate and Native American lands "skyrocketed." 8 In 1989, vandals and
thieves stole from at least ninety percent of the Native American sites in
the Southwest, including all of the classic Mimbres sites.9 Motivation to
continue archaeological looting remains strong due to the activity's repu-
tation as "'a relatively low-risk activity with a high-profit potential.' "'o
As early as 1879, Congress exhibited both an awareness of and a legis-
lative commitment to protecting archaeological resources." A century
4. Individuals who dig for artifacts are called "relic collectors, pothunters, treasure
seekers, even 'para- archaeologists.'" Harvey Arden, Who Owns Our Past?, 175 NAT'L
GEOGRAPHIC, 376, 378 (1989). Others may classify "them as looters, desecrators, even
commercial grave robbers." Id.
5. Archaeological looting operations are extremely sophisticated. When a site of
known commercial value is discovered, "[pirofessional looters employ portable generators,
prefabricated huts, earthmoving and excavation equipment, power tools and metal detec-
tors" to remove objects from an archaeological site successfully. Leslie S. Potter & Bruce
Zagaris, Toward a Common U.S.-Mexican Cultural Heritage: The Need for a Regional
Americas Initiative in the Recovery and Return of Stolen Cultural Property, 5 TRANSNAT'L.
LAW. 627, 635 (1992); see Moore, supra note 3, at 469.
6. See Fish, supra note 1, at 685; see also Goodwin, supra note 3, at 65. To illustrate
the potential profit to an archaeological looter, the artifacts from a single cliff dwelling of
the Anasazi, or the "'Ancient Ones,'" located at the south-eastern tip of Utah, may be
worth nearly $1 million. Goodwin, supra note 3, at 65. The artifacts may be "sold to
museums, galleries and private collectors" who rarely question the origin of the objects.
Id. at 66.
7. Grace Glueck, Someone is Stealing the Great Pots of America, N.Y. TIMEs, June
17, 1979, at E20 (anticipating the passage of the Archaeological Resources Protection Act).
By 1979, looting reached such exorbitant proportions that one senator indicated that the
thievery of American artifacts was "a major industry in crime." 125 CONG. REC. 21,240
(1979) (statement of Sen. Domenici).
8. John Neary, A Legacy of Wanton Thievery, ARCHAEOLOGY, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 57,
58 (detailing an undercover agent's plight in trying to capture archaeological looters).
Looting during the 1980s was so devastating that one commentator stated that archaeologi-
cal resources were "an endangered species." Northey, supra note 3, at 61.
9. Neary, supra note 8, at 58. "Mimbres" refers to one of the many Native American
ancient cultures. Goodwin, supra note 3, at 65. Commercial looters frequently bring to the
market artifacts derived from the Anasazi, Hopi, Hohokam, Caddo, Salado, and Hopewell
cultures. Id.
10. Neary, supra note 8, at 58.
11. See Kristine 0. Rogers, Visigoths Revisited: The Prosecution of Archaeological Re-
source Thieves, Traffickers, and Vandals, 2 J. ENvTL. L. & Lmo. 47, 48-51 (1987) (outlin-
ing the historical background for archaeological resource protection prior to the
Antiquities Act of 1906). Events such as the establishment of the Smithsonian's Bureau of
Ethnology, the founding of the Anthropological Society of Washington, and the organiza-
tion of the Archaeological Institute of America also symbolized a public interest in
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later, Congress enacted the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of
1979 (ARPA)' 2 as an aggressive attempt to preserve the Nation's
archaeological treasures. 13 Congress enacted ARPA because its prede-
cessor, the Antiquities Act of 1906,14 contained unconstitutionally vague
terms and therefore no longer was effective in combating archaeological
looting.'5 To prevent another archaeological criminal statute from being
rendered unconstitutionally vague, the promoters of ARPA worked dili-
gently to ensure that the legislative history and the statutory language of
ARPA were "abundantly clear.' 16 Despite congressional efforts to create
unambiguous statutory language, ARPA's provisions were challenged in
United States v. Gerber,'7 a case of first impression.
Gerber was convicted under the interstate trafficking provision' 8 of
ARPA, which prohibits the sale of artifacts taken in violation of state or
local law and sold through interstate commerce.' 9 Gerber's conviction
was unique in that he excavated the artifacts from private lands and later
transported them through interstate commerce.20 Gerber argued that
ARPA was applicable only to public and Indian lands2' by citing the stat-
archaeological protection. Id. at 48-49. The public, showing a concern for archaeological
protection, began to lobby Congress for legislation to ensure the protection of archaeologi-
cal resources. Id. at 49. Archaeological protection soon became an important congres-
sional objective upon Congress' recognition that our Nation's lands contained a plethora of
rich and diverse cultural resources. Northey, supra note 3, at 64.
12. Pub. L. No. 96-95, 93 Stat. 721 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-
470mm (1988)).
13. Fish, supra note 1, at 694. ARPA "was particularly directed toward unauthorized
excavations motivated by the high prices paid for prehistoric North American art." Id.
Congress enacted ARPA as a response to commercial looters enjoying "virtual immunity"
from prosecution as they plundered vast and valuable archaeological sites. Id.
14. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1988); see infra notes 42-63 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Antiquities Act).
15. See 16 U.S.C. § 470aa(a)(3) (1988). Congress specifically addressed vagueness
concerns by stating that "existing Federal laws [did] not provide adequate protection to
prevent the loss and destruction of these archaeological resources and sites resulting from
uncontrolled excavations and pillage." Id.
16. 125 CONG. REc. 17,395 (1979) (statement of Rep. Rhodes); see infra notes 133-43
and accompanying text (discussing ARPA's legislative history).
17. 999 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 878 (1994).
18. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(c) (1988). This provision provides that "[nmo person may sell,
purchase, exchange, transport, receive, or offer to sell, purchase, or exchange, in interstate
or foreign commerce, any archaeological resource excavated, removed, sold, purchased,
exchanged, transported, or received in violation of any provision, rule, regulation, ordi-
nance, or permit in effect under State or local law." Id.
19. Gerber, 999 F.2d at 1113.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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ute's legislative history2 2 and the preamble of the Act itself.' While the
Act withstood Gerber's challenge in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, the arguments raised in Gerber with respect to
ARPA's enforcement provisions are disturbing, particularly in light of the
deliberate efforts by ARPA's sponsors to create unambiguous statutory
language.25 Gerber's proposed narrow interpretation of ARPA, which
would limit the Act's application solely to public and Indian lands, serves
as both a potential loophole for the archaeological looter in avoiding
criminal prosecution2 6 and a likely danger to as yet undetected archaeo-
logical resources located on private lands throughout the United States.27
Gerber's secondary argument regarding ARPA's interstate trafficking
provision concerns the statute's reference to "any" state or local law.28
Gerber asserted that the reference to "any" encompasses solely state
archaeological protection laws and not necessarily "any" law.29 In mak-
ing such an argument, Gerber distinguished between those laws expressly
protecting archaeological objects or sites and more general laws such as
those regarding trespass and theft.30 A court's use of this construction
would hinder the government's ability to prosecute certain archaeological
looters under ARPA. Looters could move resources through interstate
commerce from a state lacking very specific or sophisticated archaeologi-
cal protection laws.3
In addition to attacking specifically the language of ARPA's interstate
trafficking provision, Gerber also asserted that the entire provision was
void for vagueness 32 and thus violated his Fifth Amendment due process
22. Id. at 1115. Gerber focused particularly on congressional debate surrounding the
enactment of ARPA. Id An example of a statement supporting Gerber's argument is set
forth by Congressman Udall who stated that ARPA "does not affect any lands other than
the public lands of the United States and lands held in trust by the United States for Indian
tribes or individual Indian allottees." 125 CoNo. REc. 17,394 (1979)
23. Gerber, 999 F.2d at 1115. The preamble to ARPA explains that "[t]he purpose of
this chapter is to secure ... the protection of archaeological resources and sites which are
on public lands and Indian lands." 16 U.S.C. § 470aa(b) (1988).
24. Gerber, 999 F.2d at 1116-17.
25. See supra text accompanying note 16 (noting attempts by ARPA's drafters to cre-
ate unambiguous statutory language).
26. Gerber, 999 F.2d at 1117.
27. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text (discussing the dangers posed to
archaeological resources).
28. Gerber, 999 F.2d at 1113; see supra note 18 (providing the text of ARPA's inter-
state trafficking provision).
29. Gerber, 999 F.2d at 1113.
30. Id
31. See infra notes 86-100 and accompanying text (discussing various state laws pro-
tecting archaeological resources and Native American burials).
32. See Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 67 (1960) (providing an extensive overview of the void for vagueness doctrine); see
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rights.33 In particular, Gerber challenged that the statutory language did
not provide adequate notice as to ARPA's application to private lands.3'
Without adequate notice, Gerber argued that he had no way of knowing
that his activity was prohibited.35
Traditionally, in construing a statute in a case of first impression, statu-
tory construction begins with the language of the statute itself.36 The in-
quiry then may proceed to ensuring that the plain meaning of the statute
will not produce a result precisely at odds with Congress' intent.37 In the
event that the plain meaning of the statute is not entirely clear, an exami-
nation of the intent of the legislature is the most frequently followed prin-
ciple of statutory construction.38 Courts turn to legislative history to
determine congressional intent.39 A literal and cursory interpretation of
the legislative history of ARPA bolstered Gerber's arguments, making his
also infra notes 225-48 and accompanying text (discussing the void for vagueness doctrine
and its applicability to ARPA).
33. Brief for Appellant at 38-43, United States v. Gerber, 999 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir.
1993) (No. EV 91-19-CR) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant]; see also infra notes 225-48 and
accompanying text (discussing the void for vagueness doctrine and its due process
implications).
34. Gerber, 999 F.2d at 1115.
35. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 33, at 38.
36. See, e.g., West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 99 (1991) (stating
that where a statute's language is plain, the court's function is to enforce it in conformity
with its terms); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (stating
that the task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of statutes begins with the language
of the statute itself), superseded by statute as stated in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S.
Ct. 1483 (1994); Mallard v. United States Dist. Court., 490 U.S. 296, 300 (1989) (stating that
the "[i]nterpretation of a statute must begin with the statute's language").
37. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1169 (1993) (stating that a statute's plain
meaning will not be conclusive if a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary ex-
ists); Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 242 (stating that the plain meaning of the statute governs unless
a situation exists in which the literal application of the statute "'will produce a result de-
monstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters' "(quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Con-
tractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982))); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
432 n.12 (1987) (stating that when the plain language of a statute is clear courts examine
legislative history to see only whether their is an expressed legislative intent at odds with
the plain meaning).
38. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896-97 (1984) (stating that when a question of
federal law is predicated upon interpretation of a statute that is unclear, the first inquiry
looks to the statutory language and the second inquiry looks to the legislative history); see
also NoRMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.05, at 22 (5th ed.
1992) (stating that intent of the legislature most frequently is used to interpret statutes).
The principle of examining legislative history is based upon the assumption "that an obliga-
tion to construe statutes so that they carry out the will, real or attributed, of the lawmaking
branch of the government is mandated by principles of separation of powers." Id.
39. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 896; United States v. Fairman, 947 F.2d 1479, 1482 (11th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1503 (1992); Funbus Sys., Inc. v. California Public Utilities
Comm., 801 F.2d 1120, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 1986).
19951
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challenge unique.40 The Seventh Circuit, however, went beyond the
Act's legislative history and concluded that Congress intended the inter-
state trafficking provision to protect archaeological resources, notwith-
standing the type of land from which a resource is derived. 4'
This Comment outlines the evolution of the United States archaeologi-
cal resource protection. laws, up to and beyond ARPA. Next, this Com-
ment focuses on United States v. Gerber and its impact on ARPA and
archaeological preservation law. This Comment articulates the appropri-
ate statutory construction of ARPA, focusing on ARPA's applicability to
private lands and the incorporation of state law under ARPA. This Com-
ment also dispels the validity of void for vagueness challenges under
ARPA and asserts that ARPA's interstate trafficking provision is unam-
biguous on its face. This Comment argues that to ensure complete pro-
tection of the United States' archaeological resources, ARPA should be
amended or its regulations should be revised to provide more specific
language that would clarify to which lands ARPA is applicable and under
what incorporated state law a violator can be prosecuted. This Comment
concludes that without proper construction of the statute, ARPA's effi-
cacy and the future of the United States archaeological resources may be
endangered.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORIC
PRESERVATION LAWS: PROCEDURAL AND BACKGROUND
INFORMATION
A. Federal Legislation Prior to ARPA: Inadequate Provisions for
Protecting Archaeological Resources
1. The Antiquities Act of 1906
Prior to the enactment of ARPA in 1979, the Antiquities Act of 190642
served as the primary protection for archaeological resources on federal
and Native American lands.41 The Act declares a general commitment to
40. See United States v. Gerber, 999 F.2d 1112, 1115 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 878 (1994). The Seventh Circuit aligned with Gerber by pointing out that the Act itself,
the legislative history of the Act, and most scholarly commentators do not mention
ARPA's application to private lands. Id. The court, however, further stated that the non-
existence of any reference to private lands merely could be attributed to the fact that most
of the Nation's archaeological sites are located on Indian reservations or federal public
lands. Id.
41. Id The Seventh Circuit found that the interstate trafficking provision functions as
a "catch-all provision." Id. Despite legislative history implying ARPA's applicability
solely to public and Native American lands, the court believed that the purposes of the Act
would not be undermined by interpreting ARPA as being applicable to private lands. Id.
42. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1988).
43. Id § 433. The Antiquities Act provides:
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preservation policy," provides for the issuance of permits for excavation
purposes,45 and institutes enforcement provisions and penalties for any-
one who attempts to "appropriate, excavate, injure, or destroy" any po-
tential "object of antiquity."'
Despite its commitment to preservation, the Antiquities Act's penalties
were clearly insufficient to deter potential archaeological traffickers and
looters.47 For instance, an individual convicted under the statute could be
fined no more than $500 or be imprisoned for no more than ninety days.48
With archaeological objects selling for vast amounts of money,49 traffick-
ers and looters began to treat these fines as mere business expenses.5 0
For instance, during the 1970s, when the Antiquities Act was the only
statutory protection for archaeological resources, a single Southwestern
piece of pottery could garner $8,000-$10,000 on the market.51 With this
type of profit at stake, archaeological looters viewed a $500 fine or a few
days in jail as a cost of doing business.5 2
The most serious deficiency of the Antiquities Act resulted from its
language: "any object of antiquity. ''5 3 A looter challenged this language
in United States v. Diaz, 4 in which the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit found the penalty provisions of the Antiquities Act
Any person who shall appropriate, excavate, injure, or destroy any historic or
prehistoric ruin or monument, or any object of antiquity, situated on lands owned
or controlled by the Government of the United States, without the permission of
the Secretary of the Department of the Government having jurisdiction over the
lands on which said antiquities are situated, shall, upon conviction, be fined in a
sum of not more than $500 or be imprisoned for a period of not more than ninety
days, or shall suffer both fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
Id
44. See id § 431.
45. See id § 432.
46. See id § 433; see supra note 43 (providing the full text of section 433).
47. See Northey, supra note 3, at 71.
48. 16 U.S.C. § 433.
49. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text (discussing the profitability of
archaeological looting).
50. Fish, supra note 1, at 688; see Northey, supra note 3, at 71. A $500 fine may have
seemed like an exorbitant amount of money immediately following the enactment of the
Antiquities Act in 1906. Fish, supra note 1, at 688. More recently, as the commercial
vandal becomes highly motivated by the profitable black market for artifacts, $500 repre-
sents a minor business expense. Id
51. Glueck, supra note 7, at E20.
52. Id.
53. 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1988); see also supra note 43 (providing the text of the prohibited
acts provision for the Antiquities Act).
54. 499 F.2d 113, 114-15 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding the term " 'objects of antiquity' " to
be "fatally vague" and in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of
the United States Constitution).
1995)
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to be unconstitutionally vague.55 In Diaz, the appellant was charged with
appropriating a face mask found in a cave on the San Carlos Indian Res-
ervation.56 At trial, an expert on religious systems of the Western
Apache in the State of Arizona testified that an object of antiquity could
include virtually anything, even something that was made yesterday if it
pertained "to religious or social traditions of long standing."57 Based on
this testimony, the court indicated that, absent definitional guidance in
the statute, one reasonably would not know which articles constitute ob-
jects of antiquity5 and, therefore, held that the statute's provisions were
void for vagueness.5 9
The Diaz decision created serious doubts as to whether the Act could
protect objects of antiquity.' Subsequent to Diaz, prosecutors continued
to face constitutional challenges to the Act.6' It became apparent,
though, that the primary problem with the Antiquities Act was the diffi-
culty in finding a balance between providing adequate notice and ensur-
ing expansive archaeological resource protection.62 With the state of
archaeological protection law in flux, ARPA was needed to reconcile and
respect each of these countervailing interests.63
55. Id. The court addressed vague laws as generally offending "'several important
values... [because they] may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning.'" Id. at 114
(quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)).
56. Id
57. Id.
58. Id at 115.
59. Id.
60. The unconstitutionality of the Antiquities Act directly affected the states located
within the Ninth Circuit where a vast majority of the archaeological resources are located.
SHERRY Hurr ET AL., ARCHEOLOGICAL RESOURCE PROTECrION 24 (1992). The states
within this jurisdiction include Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Ne-
vada, Oregon, and Washington. Id.
61. See Northey, supra note 3, at 72 n.75. Prosecutors were somewhat successful in
convicting archaeological looters even with the demise of the Antiquities Act. For exam-
ple, despite the Diaz decision, the Tenth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Antiq-
uities Act in United States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939, 941 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 843
(1979). Furthermore, some prosecutors charged archaeological looters under federal theft
and malicious mischief statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 607 F.2d 269, 270-271 (9th
Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1085 (1980). The penalties under these statutes were far
more severe than under the Antiquities Act, with fines up to $10,000 and/or imprisonment
up to 10 years. Hurrr, supra note 60, at 26.
62. Northey, supra note 3, at 73.
63. Until the enactment of ARPA in 1979, the Antiquities Act served as the primary
federal law committed to protecting archaeological objects located on federal lands. HUTrr,
supra note 60, at 23. Other federal laws pertaining generally to historic preservation in-
clude the Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities Act of 1935, 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467 (1988
& Supp. 1992); National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470t (1988 &
Supp. 1992); Reservoir Salvage Act of 1960, as amended by the Archaeological and Histor-
ical Preservation Act of 1974, 16 U.S.C. §§ 469-469c (1988 & Supp. 1992). The inherent
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2. The Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979
Congress recognized the imminent threat to our Nation's valuable
archaeological heritage and the inadequacy of existing federal and state
preservation law. As a result, Congress enacted ARPA in 1979.64
ARPA's stated purpose is to ensure that the archaeological resources of
our Nation will be protected and secured for both the present and fu-
ture.65 ARPA defines an archaeological resource as "any material re-
mains of past human life or activities which are of archaeological
interest.,66 ARPA exempts, however, arrowheads from the ground sur-
face 67 and paleontological objects68 from the definition of an archaeologi-
cal resource. Furthermore, ARPA only will treat an item as an
archaeological resource if the item is at least 100 years old.69 ARPA al-
lows any person to apply to the Federal Land Manager for an excavation
permit,70 which attaches certain terms and conditions to the excavation
deficiencies of the Antiquities Act and the failure of the subsequent federal preservation
laws to address the problem of archaeological looting dictated the need for new archaeo-
logical resource protection legislation. Hurr, supra note 60, at 27. Documented enforce-
ment totals under the Antiquities Act-18 convictions, $4,000 in fines, and two 90-day jail
sentences-exhibited that the Act's provisions were ineffective. I& at 25. Further, at-
tempts by Native Americans to exert criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians have failed;
therefore, Native Americans lack the power to prosecute archaeological looters and traf-
fickers. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,'195-212 (1978) (holding
that Indian tribal courts do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians).
64. Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-95, 93 Stat. 721
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm (1988)). Despite the existence of the
Antiquities Act and other laws of general application, looters continually pillaged archaeo-
logical sites on public and Native American lands, thus requiring legislation that would
safeguard these endangered sites effectively. H=r, supra note 60, at 29.
65. 16 U.S.C. § 470aa(b) (1988). ARPA is designed "to secure, for the present and
future benefit of the American people, the protection of archaeological resources and sites
which are on public lands and Indian lands." Id.
66. Id. § 470bb(1); see also supra note 3 and accompanying text (providing a more
specific definition of what constitutes an archaeological resource).
67. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(g) (1988). Even though these arrowheads are undoubtedly
archaeological resources, Congress, nevertheless, chose to exempt these items under
ARPA. Id; see also Northey, supra note 3, at 78. Some archaeologists find this exemption
objectionable. Fish, supra note 1, at 695. What is ironic about the exemption is that it
actually does not protect the arrowhead collector, who still remains subject to general fed-
eral theft and malicious mischief statutes. Northey, supra note 3, at 79.
68. 43 C.F.R. § 7.3(a)(4)(i) (1993). Paleontological objects found in an archaeological
context, however, are subject to ARPA. 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(2) (1988).
69. 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(1) (1988). This time limit helps to distinguish ARPA's defini-
tion of archaeological resource from the definition of object of antiquity under the Antiq-
uities Act. See supra notes 42-63 and accompanying text (discussing the vagueness of the
term object of antiquity under the Antiquities Act). The 100-year limit provides an avail-
able cutoff in determining what constitutes an archaeological resource. Northey, supra
note 3, at 77.
70. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc (1988).
1995]
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activities.7 ARPA exhibits a commitment to criminally prosecuting
archaeological looters while also emphasizing education and the preser-
vation and protection of archaeological resources.72 ARPA also recog-
nizes the importance of preserving Native American culture, both out of
concern for history and in deference to American Indian Tribal self-gov-
ernment.73 To implement ARPA, various federal agencies have adopted
uniform regulations.74
The most significant, as well as recently controversial and problem-
atic,75 components of ARPA are the prohibited acts and penalties provi-
sions, particularly the interstate trafficking provision.76 Under the first of
ARPA's prohibited acts, the statute forbids the excavation and removal
of objects located on public and Indian lands without an authorized per-
mit.77 Furthermore, in the second prohibited act, ARPA aggressively
pursues the archaeological trafficker by prohibiting the sale, purchase, or
71. Id. More particularly, a permit may be issued if several requirements are satisfied.
Initially, the applicant must be qualified to investigate the archaeological site. Id.
§ 470cc(b)(1). Next, the activity must be undertaken to further archaeological knowledge
in the public interest. Id. § 470cc(b)(2). Furthermore, the United States remains the right-
ful owner to any resource removed from public lands. Id. § 470cc(b)(3). Moreover, the
activity must be consistent with management plan for the affected lands. Id. § 470cc(b)(4).
Finally, for any archaeological excavation on Indian lands, tribal approval must be ob-
tained. Id. § 470cc(g)(2).
72. HuTrr, supra note 60, at 31. ARPA's dual commitment to prohibiting criminal
activity and promoting education and preservation explains its unique position within the
United States Code. See id. Not only is ARPA a federal criminal statute, it also serves as
"a catalyst for education and the interaction of interest groups to preserve andprotect
archaeological resources." Id.
73. Id.; see 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(g) (1988). Although ARPA may require notification to
Native American tribes affected by an ARPA excavation permit, 43 C.F.R. § 7.7 (1993),
commentators have argued that ARPA does not address Native American concerns suc-
cessfully. See Sherry Hutt, Illegal Trafficking in Native American Human Remains and
Cultural Items: A New Protection Tool, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 135, 136-37 (1992). Native Amer-
icans find ARPA's characterization of Native American human remains as an "'archaeo-
logical resource' "to be offensive. Id at 136. In response to Native American concerns for
the reburial of their human remains, Congress has enacted more specific criminal legisla-
tion. See Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-601,
§ 4(a), 104 Stat. 3048, 3052 (1990) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (Supp. V 1993)) (creating a
felony offense for illegal trafficking in Native American human remains and cultural
items).
74. Federal agencies have promulgated the following uniform regulations to ARPA
pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 470ii (1988): (1) Department of the Interior, 43 C.F.R. § 7 (1993);
(2) Department of Agriculture, 36 C.F.R. § 296 (1993); (3) Department of Defense, 32
C.F.R. § 229 (1993); (4) Tennessee Valley Authority, 18 C.F.R. § 1312 (1992); (5) Army
Corps of Engineers, ER 405-1-71.
75. See infra notes 144-204 and accompanying text (discussing controversial and prob-
lematic issues relating to ARPA's interstate trafficking provision).
76. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(c) (1988); see also supra note 18 (providing the text of ARPA's
interstate trafficking provision).
77. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(a). ARPA's first prohibited act provision provides: "No person
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exchange of an archaeological resource 78 if the resource was removed in
violation of the first prohibited act or of any other federal law.79 Finally
ARPA, in its interstate trafficking provision, incorporates state law by
pronouncing that the statute will be violated when any person moves an
artifact through interstate or foreign commerce in conjunction with a vio-
lation of "any" state or local law.8 °
The penalties under ARPA are stringent, with fines reaching $10,000
and imprisonment for one year for an initial violation.8 1 Moreover,
ARPA provides a maximum fine of $20,000 and imprisonment for two
years82 when the value of the archaeological resource involved and the
cost of restoration to the object exceeds $500.83 A violator can be fined
up to $100,000 or imprisoned for up to five years for repeated ARPA
violations.' ARPA also provides for civil penalties to be assessed by a
Federal Land Manager based upon the value of the archaeological object
and on the restoration and repair costs.8 5
B. State Archaeological Protection Law: Lack of Uniformity Among
the States
In response to increasing incidences of archaeological looting,8 6 most
states have enacted legislation designed to preserve and protect archaeo-
logical resources.8 7 In accordance with protecting the burial sites of Na-
may excavate, remove, damage, or otherwise alter or deface ... any archaeological re-
source located on public lands or Indian lands." Id
78. See supra note 3 (defining the term archaeological resource).
79. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(b). ARPA's second prohibited act provision provides: "No per-
son may sell, purchase, exchange, transport, receive, or offer to sell, purchase, or exchange
any archaeological resource" if the resource is removed in violation of "any provision, rule,
regulation, ordinance, or permit in effect under any other provision of Federal law." Id
80. Id. § 470ee(c); see supra note 18 (providing the text of the interstate trafficking
provision).
81. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(d).
82. Id.
83. I&
84. I& The fines and imprisonment terms for subsequent offenders are more stringent
than the fines under the Antiquities Act which were more like mere business expenses.
See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text (discussing the penalties under the Antiqui-
ties Act).
85. 16 U.S.C. § 470ff.
86. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text (discussing the devastation to
archaeological resources).
87. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 41-3-1 to -3-6 (1991); ALASKA STAT. §§ 41.35.010 to .240
(1993); Aitz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-841 to -847 (1992); ARK. CODE ArN. §§ 13-6-301 to
-308 (Michie 1987); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 24-80-401 to -410 (1988 & Supp. 1994); CorN.
GEN. STAT. §§ 10-381 to -391 (1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 5301-5806 (1991); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 267.12 to .14 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ArN. §§ 12-3-52 to -54
(1992 & Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE §§ 67-4113 to -4122 (1989); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 20,
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tive Americans, numerous states have enacted repatriation, burial, and
grave protection laws.8s States approach the problem of archaeological
looters in divergent manners. A number of states reserve the right to
conduct field investigations on state-owned property.8 9 This approach
parallels ARPA's prevalence over federal lands.' In addition to exerting
control over archaeological excavations located on state-owned lands,
some states impose duties upon those excavating on privately owned
para. 3435/.01 to 3435/11 (1992); IND. CODE §§ 14-3-3.4-1 to .4-20 (1993); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 74-5401 to -5408 (1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 164.705 to .735 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41:1601 to :1614 (West 1990); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 27,
§ 371-378 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN. NAT. RES., §§ 2-101 to -407 (1989
& Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 9, §§ 26A-27C (West 1986); MIcH. Comp.
LAWS ANN. §§ 299.51 to .55 (West 1984 & Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 138.31 to .42
(West 1994 & Supp. 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. § 39-7-1 to -41 (1990); NEV. REv. STAT.
§§ 381.195 to .227 (1991); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 227-C:1 to C:12 (1989 & Supp. 1993);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1L-10 (West 1991) (only applicable to state parks); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 18-6-1 to -17 (Michie 1991); N.Y. PARKS REc. & Hisr. PRESERV. LAW §§ 14.01 to .09
(McKinney 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 70-10 to -20 (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 55-03-00.1
to -03-07 (1993); Oino REV. CODE ANN. §§ 149.51 to .56 (Anderson 1990); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 53, § 361 (1991); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 358.905 to .955 (1993); 37 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 506, 511 (Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-45.1-2 to -45.1-13 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 54-7-680 (Law. Co-op. 1992) (protecting underwater antiquities); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. §§ 1-20-17 to -37 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 11-6-101 to -119 (1992); TEX. NAT.
RES. CODE ANN. §§ 191.001 to .174 (West 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 9-8-301 to -308
(1992 & Supp. 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 701 to 791 (1987 & Supp. 1994); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 10.1-2300 to -2306 (Michie 1993); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 27.53.010 to .901 (1992);
W. VA. CODE § 29-1-8b (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 44.30 to .48 (West Supp. 1994); Wyo.
STAT. §§ 36-1-114 to -116 (1977 & Supp. 1994).
88. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-844 & -865 (1992); CAL. PUB. REs. CODE
§ 5097.9 to .991 (Deering 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-381 to -391 (1993); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 7, §§ 5403 to 5411 (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 872.01 to .05 (West 1994); IDAHO
CODE §§ 27-501 to -504 (1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 20, para. 3440/1 to 3440/16 (1992); IND.
CODE §§ 14-3-3.4-16 to .4-18 (1993); IOWA CODE §§ 566.31 to .34 (1993); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 75-2741 to -2754 (1989 & Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8:671 to :681 (West
Supp. 1995); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2842-B (West Supp. 1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 7, § 38A (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 307.08 (West 1985 & Supp.
1995); Miss. CODE ANN. § 39-7-31 (1990); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 194.400 to .410 (Supp. 1995);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3-801 to -811 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 12-1201 to -1212
(1991); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 383.150 to .190 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 227-C:8 to :8-
j (1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-6-11.2, 30-12-12, 58-17-1 (Michie 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 70-26 to -40 (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 55-03-00.1 to -03-07 (1993); OKLA. STAT. tit.
21, §§ 1161 to 1163 (1991); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.740 to .760 (1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. 99 34-27-19 to -32 (1994); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-401 to -406 (1992); VA. CODE
ANN. § 10.1-2300 to -2306 (Michie 1993); WASH. REV. CODE § 27.44.020 (1992); W. VA.
CODE § 29-1-8a (1992 & Supp. 1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 157.70 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994).
89. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 13-6-301 (Michie 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-80-
401 (1988 & Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 138.32 (West 1994); 37 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 506 (Supp. 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 762 (1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 44.47
(West Supp. 1994).
90. See 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(2) (1988) (indicating that the Federal Land Manager shall
have "primary management authority" over public lands).
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lands.9' Despite a state's reservation of exclusive archaeological survey
rights, archaeologists not employed by the state usually can survey state
sites upon obtaining a permit.92 Penalties are imposed upon those who
violate state archaeological and burial protection laws.9 3
Some states are concerned with protecting particular archaeological
sites and the objects found within those sites. For instance, some state
laws focus on protecting caves,' submerged resources,9 5 or burial sites.96
In discussing state archaeological protection laws, it is critical to note that
ARPA applies only to public,97 Native American,9" and, in certain in-
stances, private lands.99 In light of this, if a state fails to protect archaeo-
logical resources on state lands, a potential loophole exists for the
archaeological looter."°
II. CHALLENGES TO ARPA AND ARPA's LEGIsLATIvE HISTORY
A. Challenges Under ARPA
The National Park Service reported 1,720 violations of archaeological
protection laws from 1985 to 1987.101 Of these reported violations, only
91. See, e.g., ARc. CODE ANN. § 13-6-301 (Michie 1987); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83B,
§ 5-621 (1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-11 (Michie 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 70-1 (1991);
see also Whitacre v. Indiana, 619 N.E.2d 605, 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that the
Indiana Historic Preservation and Archaeology Act applies to privately owned land and,
therefore, requires permits for excavation on private lands), transfer granted, op. adopted,
629 N.E.2d 1236 (Ind. 1994).
92. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-386 (1993) (stating the policy for administering
permits for archaeological investigation on state lands); FLA. STAT. § 267.12 (1993) (re-
garding the issuance of research permits); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 20, para. 3435/6 (1992) (re-
garding the issuance of permits); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-11 (Michie 1991) (stating that a
permit is required for excavation of archaeological sites).
93. See supra notes 87-88 (discussing and listing various state penalty provisions).
94. See, e.g., ARx. CODE ANN. § 15-20-601 (Michie 1992); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83B,
§ 5-628 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1002 (Michie 1993).
95. See, e.g., CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 6314 (Deering 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-3-81
(1992); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41:1605 (West 1990); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83B, § 5-611.1
(1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 54-7-620 (Law. Co-op. 1992).
96. See supra note 88 (discussing human remains, repatriation, and reburial protection
laws).
97. 16 U.S.C. § 470aa-470mm (1988).
98. Id.
99. See infra notes 144-204 and accompanying text (discussing ARPA's applicability to
private lands).
100. A state, however, often can utilize general laws of trespass to protect against loot-
ing. United States v. Gerber, 999 F.2d 1112, 1113 (7th Cir. 1993), cert denied, 114 S. Ct.
878 (1994).
101. See Huor, supra note 60, at 13. The National Park Service's figure of 1,720 re-
ported violations only represents documented violations and is most likely representative
of 25% or less of actual violations of archaeological protection laws. Id
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eleven percent resulted in arrests or citations. °2 Although very few deci-
sions involving ARPA violations are published, the few that do exist pose
a potential threat to ARPA's effectiveness. °3
In 1989, the defendant in United States v. Austin" challenged ARPA's
provisions as unconstitutionally overbroad. Austin concerned the recov-
ery of approximately 2,800 Native American artifacts excavated by Aus-
tin through archaeological looting.1 5 Austin based his challenge on the
argument that ARPA infringed upon his First Amendment freedom of
academic curiosity.'" Austin also challenged ARPA as vague, asserting
that he did not receive fair notice that his conduct was prohibited.10 7
Austin argued that the terms "weapons" and "tools"' 8 were ambiguous
and did not put him on notice that he was prohibited from excavating
"scrapers" and "arrow points."'1 9 The Ninth Circuit rejected both of
Austin's claims and held that there can be no doubt that scrapers and
arrow points are weapons and tools." °
In the three published cases involving ARPA subsequent to Austin, the
constitutionality of the statute was not challenged."' Since then, cases
decided under ARPA are sparse,1 2 with the exception of United States v.
Gerber.113
102. Id. at 14.
103. See infra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing a vagueness challenge under
ARPA).
104. 902 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 874 (1990).
105. Id. at 743.
106. Id. at 744. Austin argued that because he was motivated by curiosity, his activity
was academic and, therefore, warranted protection as academic freedom. Id. The court
characterized Austin's argument as "creative," but nevertheless rejected his assertion. Id.
107. Id. at 745.
108. Under ARPA's definitions, the terms weapons and tools are encompassed within
the definition of archaeological resource. 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(1) (1988).
109. Austin, 902 F.2d at 745.
110. Id.
111. See United States v. Charlton, No. 90-6454/91-5091, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 9456,
at *11 (6th Cir. Apr. 28, 1992) (per curiam) (affirming a conviction under ARPA for the
excavation of a Cherokee Indian burial cave located on public lands in the Cherokee Na-
tional Forest); United States v. Preston, No. 91-6165/91-6166, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 826,
at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 1992) (per curiam) (affirming defendants conviction under ARPA
for excavating civil war artifacts located on the Shiloh National Military Park), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 244 (1992); United States v. Potter, No. 91-5457/91-5459, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
3778, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 4, 1992) (per curiam) (concerning a sentencing appeal of an
individual convicted of damaging an archaeological resource under 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(a)-
(d) (1988)).
112. See United States v. Sherman, No. 92-2197, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 21627, at *8
(10th Cir. Aug. 20, 1993) (affirming appellant's conviction under ARPA for the removal of
artifacts from an Indian ruin site within the Gila National Forest); see also supra note 111.
113. 999 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 878 (1994).
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The challenges to ARPA raised in Gerber"4 are reminiscent of the
constitutional challenges that rendered the provisions of the Antiquities
Act powerless to stop archaeological looters." 5 Gerber's challenge to
ARPA is most significant because he was the first defendant to force a
federal court to pass upon ARPA's applicability to private lands. In the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Arthur
Gerber pleaded guilty to misdemeanor violations of ARPA, 116 yet re-
served his right to appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit on the ground that the Act was inapplicable to his of-
fense." 7 Gerber was accused of transporting in interstate commerce In-
dian artifacts stolen from a burial mound" 8 located on privately owned
land" 9 in violation of Indiana's criminal laws of trespass and conver-
sion.12 This violation of state law in conjunction with the artifacts' sub-
sequent movement through interstate commerce triggered ARPA.
12
This case represents the first prosecution and conviction under ARPA for
the looting of archaeological objects removed from private lands.' 22
Gerber's appeal to the Seventh Circuit challenged that ARPA applied
only to archaeological objects removed from public or Indian lands, de-
spite the interstate trafficking provision's reference to state and local
law.' 2 3 Based on ARPA's legislative history and the Act itself, Gerber
asserted that ARPA was inapplicable to non public and non-Indian
lands.' 24 Gerber also focused on the fact that because ARPA provided
inadequate notice that it applied to private lands, ARPA was void for
114. See United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113, 114-15 (9th Cir. 1974).
115. See supra notes 42-63 and accompanying text (discussing the Antiquities Act and
its deficiencies).
116. See Guilty Plea Agreement at 5-6, United States v. Gerber, 999 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir.
1993) (No. EV 91-19-CR).
117. Gerber, 999 F.2d at 1113.
118. The mound from which Gerber looted is a representation of the Hopewell phe-
nomenon. Id. at 1114. The phenomenon consists of a series of large mounds prepared by
American Midwest Indians over 1,500 years ago that contained "human remains plus nu-
merous ceremonial artifacts and grave goods made of silver, copper, wood, cloth, leather,
obsidian, flint, mica, quartz, pearl, shells, and drilled, carved, or inlaid human and bear
teeth." Id.
119. The mound was located on private property owned by General Electric (GE). Id.
GE's actual knowledge of the existence of the mound is controverted. See Jack Gifford,
Smoke and Mirrors or G.E. Gate, INDIAN-ARTIFACr MAO., Jan.-Mar. 1994, at 5, 5.
120. Gerber, 999 F.2d at 1113; see also infra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing
Indiana's criminal laws of trespass and conversion).
121. See infra notes 154-82 and accompanying text (discussing ARPA's jurisdictional
applicability to this type of situation); see also infra notes 205-24 and accompanying text
(discussing ARPA's incorporation of state law).
122. Gerber, 999 F.2d at 1113.
123. Id.
124. Brief for Appellant, supra note 33, at 14-27; see infra notes 133-43 and accompa-
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vagueness and therefore unconstitutional. 125
Under ARPA's current structure, one possible construction of the state
and local law intended to be incorporated into the interstate trafficking
provision' 26 could be to speculate that only state archaeological protec-
tion statutes, and not statutes such as the Indiana criminal trespass and
conversion statutes that Gerber violated, are applicable.1 27 Gerber ac-
knowledged that upon entering the private lands and removing Native
American artifacts he violated Indiana's criminal trespass and conversion
laws.' 28 Gerber also admitted that he transferred the artifacts through
interstate commerce. 129 Nevertheless, Gerber insisted that despite these
violations, he did not contravene ARPA's provisions because the artifacts
were removed from private lands and he did not violate the applicable
state law under the statute. 30  The Seventh Circuit rejected all of
Gerber's arguments as to the inapplicability of ARPA to his offense,' 3 '
and the United States Supreme Court also denied Gerber's writ of
certiorari.132
B. The Legislative History: Deceptively Clear
ARPA's legislative history133 demonstrates congressional recognition
that the Antiquities Act"3 inadequately combated the illegal and lucra-
tive archaeological artifact market. 35 In enacting this new legislation,
Congress attempted to employ strict penalties corresponding to the value
hying text (discussing ARPA's legislative history and the provisions of ARPA emphasizing
ARPA's applicability solely to public and Indian lands).
125. Brief for Appellant, supra note 33, at 38.
126. See supra note 18 (providing the text of ARPA's interstate trafficking provision).
127. The inapplicability of general criminal trespass and conversion statutes under
ARPA's interstate provision incorporating state law is the very argument made by Gerber.
Gerber, 999 F.2d at 1113; see also Brief for Appellant, supra note 33, at 43-46.
128. Gerber, 999 F.2d at 1114. Indiana criminal trespass occurs when a person "know-
ingly or intentionally interferes with the possession or use of the property of another per-
son without the person's consent." IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-2-2(4) (1993). Criminal
conversion is committed when a person "knowingly or intentionally exerts unauthorized
control over property of another person." IND. CODE § 35-43-4-3.
129. Gerber, 999 F.2d at 1114.
130. Id. at 1113.
131. Id at 1115.
132. United States v. Gerber, 114 S. Ct. 878 (1994).
133. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 311, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1979
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1707 (Report of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Committee);
125 CONG. REc. 17,391-96 (1979).
134. See supra notes 42-63 and accompanying text (discussing the Antiquities Act).
135. See 125 CONG. REc. 21,240 (statement of Sen. Hatfield) (remarking that "the An-
tiquities Act of 1906, which has provided the legal basis for protecting America's prehisto-
ric and historic heritage, is no longer adequate").
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of the resource damaged or removed.'36 During congressional debate,
Representative Udall attempted to clarify the Act by emphasizing exactly
what the Act would not do.137 He emphasized that ARPA would not
affect any lands other than public and Indian lands.138  Furthermore,
Representative Clausen clarified the term public land by illustrating that
"[s]tate and private lands, including inholdings in conservation units such
as parks, are not included within the definition."'1 39 Conversely, a House
report' 4° relating to the passage of the Act de-emphasized the public/
private distinction and commented that ARPA would apply when an
archaeological resource was obtained in violation of State or local law
and subsequently moved through interstate commerce. 141 Representa-
tive Clausen believed at the time that Congress had "eliminated to a
great extent the potential for controversy" by meticulously explaining the
provisions of the Act.1 4 2 On the Senate side, Senator Domenici of New
Mexico placed an article into the Senate record indicating the Act would
coincide with existing state laws so that offenders could not flee to other
states to avoid criminal prosecution. 143
136. 125 CONG. RFc. 21,239 (statement of Sen. Bumpers). Senator Bumpers remarked,
"[tihe purpose of S. 490 is to provide greater protection than currently exists for archeo-
logical resources located on public lands and Indian lands by providing penalties commen-
surate with the value of the resources damaged or removed from those lands." Id.
137. 125 CONG. REc. 17,393 (statement of Rep. Udall). Representative Udall re-
marked, "I want to emphasize in the boldest terms possible what this bill does not do." Id.
138. In emphasizing ARPA's applicability to public and Indian lands, Representative
Udall stated that the Act "does not affect any lands other than the public lands of the
United States and lands held in trust by the United States for Indian tribes or individual
Indian allottees." Id. at 17,394.
139. Id. (statement of Rep. Clausen). Representative Clausen's words, which seemed
to demarcate ARPA's limitations, encouraged Gerber to challenge the statute and its ap-
plicability to artifacts removed from private lands. Brief for Appellant, supra note 33, at
26.
140. H.R. REP. No. 311, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 11, reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1709.
141. See id. The House report explained that ARPA's interstate trafficking provision
"precludes the sale and transportation in interstate or foreign commerce when the re-
sources are involved in violations of State or local law." Id. at 11, reprinted in 1979
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1713. This language supports the applicability of ARPA to privately
owned lands. See infra notes 144-204 and accompanying text (discussing ARPA's applica-
tion to privately owned lands).
142. 125 CONG. REc. 17,394 (statement of Rep. Clausen).
143. Id. at 21,241.
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C. ARPA's Applicability to Private Lands: Moving Beyond the
Legislative History
1. Statutory Construction of ARPA in Light of the Legislative
History
To ensure ARPA's effectiveness, its interstate trafficking provision'"
must extend generally to the protection of archaeological artifacts, re-
gardless of their origin or location.' 45 As a matter of statutory construc-
tion, an inquiry into the meaning of ARPA should begin by examining
the statute on its face.' 6 Some commentators persuasively argue that the
interstate trafficking provision, on its face, is applicable to private
lands. 47 Other groups easily find the very same provision, on its face,
inapplicable to private lands. 4 In light of the potential ambiguity arising
from these differing interpretations, it is appropriate to consider the stat-
ute's legislative history.' 49 Even if the provision is found to be com-
pletely unambiguous on its face, some cases suggest that a second test,
that requires that the plain meaning of the statute should not be at odds
with congressional intent must be satisfied.' 50
ARPA's applicability to private lands is disturbing for many groups' 51
144. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(c) (1988); see also supra note 18 (providing the text of ARPA's
interstate trafficking provision).
145. Principles of statutory construction are presently in a state of flux. According to
the traditional view, statutory construction begins with an examination of the statute on its
face. United States v. Dadanian, 818 F.2d 1443, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). In the event of an
ambiguity, a court looks to the statute's legislative history. United States v. Fairman, 947
F.2d 1479, 1482 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1503 (1992). The more modern
trend, as advocated by Justice Scalia, however, looks solely to the law on its face and disre-
gards legislative intent. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 113 S. Ct. 1562, 1567 n.12 (1993).
146. See SINGER, supra note 38, § 45.07, at 31. Examining the meaning of a statute is
distinct from legislative intention and "expresses concern for giving effect to the way in
which the statute is understood by others than the members of the legislature itself." Id.
147. See infra notes 154-82 and accompanying text (discussing the statute on its face).
148. ARPA's inapplicability to private lands is the very argument espoused by Gerber
and numerous others opposed to ARPA. See Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioner at 9, Gerber v. United States, 999 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1993), (No. 93-635) [hereinaf-
ter Brief of Amici Curiae]; supra notes 144-204 and accompanying text (setting forth
Gerber's argument).
149. SINGER, supra note 38, § 45.05, at 22; see Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895
(1984).150. See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1169 (1993); United States v.
Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 433
n.12 (1987).
151. Groups traditionally supporting ARPA's inapplicability to private lands include:
the American Numismatic Association; American Society for Amateur Archaeology; An-
tique Tribal Arts Dealer Association, Inc.; Archaeological Society of Ohio, Inc.; Arkansas
Treasure Seekers; Black Thunder Marketing; Central States Archaeological Societies, Inc.;
Civil War News; Coin World; Conch Coalition, Inc.; Double Eagle Publishing; Federation
of Metal Detecting and Archaeological Clubs, Inc.; Fisher Research Lab., Inc.; Garrett
[Vol. 44:599
ARPA
because of the dichotomy between what these groups perceive as being
the drafters' intent and the Seventh Circuit's decision.'5 2 In arguing that
ARPA is inapplicable to private lands, Gerber relied heavily upon se-
lected excerpts from the statute's legislative history.'5 3 For ARPA to ful-
fill its stated purpose, however, the statute's interstate trafficking
provision must apply to private lands, regardless of the method of statu-
tory interpretation employed.
2. Examining ARPA and its Interstate Trafficking Provision on its
Face
To determine whether ARPA applies on its face to private lands, it is
important to distinguish between the established jurisdictional basis for
ARPA's interstate trafficking provision'54 and ARPA's first two catego-
ries of prohibited acts.' 55 Federal jurisdiction in ARPA's first two catego-
ries of prohibited acts is based on a connection to public or Indian
Electronics, Inc.; Gold Prospectors Association of America, Inc.; Horizon Distributing
Corporation; Indian-Artifact Magazine, Inc.; Krause Publications; Lost Treasure, Inc.;
Mid-Jersey Research & Recovery Club; Minelab Electronics, Pty. Ltd.; Modern Gold
Miner's Association, Inc.; Mother Lode Research Center; National Society of Metal
Detectorists, Inc.; North Coast Recovery Association of Ohio; People's Publishing Co.,
Inc.; Publisher's Press, Inc.; Roadrunner Prospectors Club, Inc.; Smith County Metal De-
tecting Association; Society for Documentation of Prehistoric America; South Mountain
Relic and Coin Club; Tesoro Electronics, Inc.; Texas Council of Treasure Clubs; Treasure
Coast Coalition, Inc.; Treasure Quest Magazine, Inc.; TIyndall Electronics, Inc.; and White's
Electronics, Inc. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 152, at 13-14.
152. United States v. Gerber, 999 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 878
(1994).
153. Id. at 1115.
154. See supra note 18 (providing the text of ARPA's interstate trafficking provision).
155. Under ARPA, an archaeological looter may be convicted under one or more than
one of three prohibited act provisions. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470ee(a)-(c) (1988). ARPA's first
prohibited act provides that:
No person may excavate, remove, damage, or otherwise alter or deface.., any
archaeological resource located on public lands or Indian lands unless such activ-
ity is pursuant to a permit issued under section 470cc of this title, a permit re-
ferred to in section 470cc(h)(2) of this title, or the exemption contained in section
470cc(g)(1) of this title.
Id § 470ee(a).
ARPA's second prohibited act provides that:
No person may sell, purchase, exchange, transport, receive, or offer to sell,
purchase, or exchange any archaeological resource if such resource was excavated
or removed from public lands or Indian lands in violation of.
(1) the prohibition contained in subsection (a) of this section, or
(2) any provision, rule, regulation, ordinance, or permit in effect under
any other provision of Federal law.
Id § 470ee(b); see also supra note 18 (providing the text of ARPA's third prohibited act,
the interstate trafficking provision).
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lands.1 56 The interstate trafficking provision 157 establishes federal juris-
diction by requiring two components: a relationship to "interstate or for-
eign commerce" and a violation of state or local law.' 5 ' The distinction
between the jurisdictional basis of the provisions illustrates that the inter-
state trafficking provision is more relevant to an archaeological artifact
obtained in violation of state or local law and its movement through in-
terstate commerce than the location from which the archaeological arti-
fact is removed.' 59
Despite the argument that due to its distinct jurisdictional basis"6
ARPA's interstate trafficking provision differs from the first two catego-
ries of prohibited acts,'16 Gerber challenged the interstate trafficking pro-
vision as being inapplicable to private lands. 62 Although the provision
fails to mention public or Indian lands, 6 3 Gerber's interpretation seems
credible based upon a review of other provisions within the statute em-
phasizing ARPA's application solely to public and Indian lands.16
Although the language in these provisions supports ARPA's qualification
to public and Indian lands, other language within the statute suggests
ARPA's applicability to private lands. 65
Even in the event that no other statutory language supports ARPA's
applicability to private lands, this omission does not preclude ARPA's
156. To be under the aegis of ARPA, both provisions require that the archaeological
resource be located on public or Indian lands. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470ee(a), (b); see also supra
note 155 (providing the text of ARPA's first two categories of prohibited acts).
157. See supra note 18 (providing the text of ARPA's interstate trafficking provision).
158. 16 U.S.C. 470ee(c); see supra note 18 (providing the text of ARPA's interstate
trafficking provision).
159. See Brief for Appellee at 22-23, United States v. Gerber, 999 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir.
1993) (No. 92-2741) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee].
160. See supra notes 154-82 and accompanying text (discussing the interstate traffick-
ing provision's distinct jurisdictional basis).
161. See supra note 155 (providing the text of ARPA's first two categories of prohibited
acts).
162. United States v. Gerber, 999 F.2d 1112, 1113 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
878 (1994).
163. See supra note 18 (providing the text of ARPA's interstate trafficking provision).
164. In ARPA's Congressional findings and declaration of purpose section, it is stated
that ARPA's purpose "is to secure, for the lresent and future benefit of the American
people, the protection of archaeological resources and sites which are on public lands and
Indian lands." 16 U.S.C. § 470aa(b) (1988). Furthermore, ARPA's savings provisions pro-
vide that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to affect any land other than public
land or Indian land." Id § 470kk(c).
165. In detailing the lands ARPA applies to, ARPA's savings provisions provide that
ARPA will not "affect the lawful recovery, collection, or sale of archaeological resources
from land other than public land or Indian land." ld. § 470kk(c). Read in the converse,
this provision suggests that ARPA will be applicable if there is an unlawful "recovery,
collection, or sale of archaeological resources" located somewhere other than public or
Indian lands. See id.
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applicability to private lands.' 66 In fact, the omission may have been de-
liberate. 67 ARPA's interstate trafficking provision differs from the first
two prohibited acts sections in that the interstate trafficking provision ex-
cludes the words "public and Indian lands."'" This exclusion makes
ARPA's interstate trafficking provision entirely different from the other
two prohibited acts' 69 and from ARPA as a whole. 7 ° Congress indicated
when public and Indian lands were implicated throughout ARPA.' 71 By
omitting the reference to public or Indian lands, Congress may have in-
tended that the section apply to private as well as public and Indian
lands.'17  Such an omission may mean that ARPA's drafters were con-
cerned with the movement of the artifacts, regardless of their origin. De-
spite this analysis, opponents to ARPA's applicability to private lands
find that Congress inadvertently omitted any reference to public and In-
dian lands in the interstate trafficking provision.' 73
The inclusion of the interstate trafficking provision as an additional
prohibited act provision, with an independent jurisdictional basis, 74 indi-
cates that Congress intended to encompass those artifacts taken from pri-
vate lands. If Congress only intended ARPA's jurisdiction to extend over
objects removed from public or Indian lands, the interstate trafficking
provision would be superfluous. 175 Without this provision, ARPA would
apply to objects removed from public or Indian lands. Consequently, the
interstate trafficking provision would be rendered superfluous because
166. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987) (stating that when "'Con-
gress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section
of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in
the disparate inclusion or exclusion' "(quoting Russello v. United States 464 U.S. 16, 23
(1983))).
167. The United States Government in its brief in Gerber asserted that "the very 'si-
lence' of this provision proclaims forth, in the clearest possible tones, the intended scope of
this prohibition, and its applicability to his conduct." Brief for Appellee, supra note 159, at
22.
168. See 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(c); supra note 18 (providing the text of the interstate traf-
ficking provision).
169. See supra note 155 (providing the text of ARPA's first two categories of prohibited
acts).
170. Brief for Appellee, supra note 159, at 22-23; see also supra notes 154-82 (compar-
ing the interstate trafficking provision and other provisions of ARPA).
171. See supra note 164 (discussing provisions emphasizing ARPA's applicability to
public and Indian lands).
172. Brief for Appellee, supra note 159, at 25.
173. United States v. Gerber, 999 F.2d 1112, 1115 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
878 (1994). More specifically, the opponents of this interpretation find that reading ARPA
as applicable to private lands is an "overzealous application of a statute in a manner wholly
unintended by Congress." See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 148, at 8.
174. See supra notes 154-82 (discussing ARPA's independent jurisdictional basis).
175. Brief for Appellee, supra note 159, at 25.
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the second prohibited act would cover an object being sold through inter-
state commerce by virtue of the objects originally having been removed
from public and Indian lands. 176 Accordingly, if the sole purpose of the
Act was to protect resources removed from only public and Indian lands,
the interstate trafficking provision would have been redundant and
unnecessary.
177
The different qualities of the interstate trafficking provision illustrate
the very distinct function that it serves. Had the drafters only wanted the
reference to interstate commerce to implicate public or Indian lands, the
second prohibited act simply could have been integrated into the inter-
state trafficking provision. 178 The addition of the interstate trafficking
provision created a "catch-all provision,"' 79 whereby federal criminal
penalties were affixed for violations of state and local laws.' 8°
Considering ARPA's interstate trafficking provision on its face and the
uniqueness of this provision with respect to ARPA as a whole, ARPA can
be found applicable to private as well as federal and Indian lands. There
still exists, however, the overwhelming use of the phrase public and In-
dian lands throughout the statute.' 8 ' If a court interpreting ARPA on its
face found that the dichotomy between ARPA's interstate trafficking
provision and the use of the phrase public and Indian lands throughout
the rest of the statute rises to the level of ambiguity, it would be appropri-
ate to proceed to the next level of statutory interpretation requiring an
examination of legislative intent. 82
3. Giving Effect to the Legislative History: Deciphering Congress'
Intent
Under general principles of statutory interpretation, when reviewing an
176. Id.
177. Gerber, 999 F.2d at 1115.
178. The provision could have read:
No person may sell, purchase ... any archaeological resource if such resource was
excavated or removed from public lands or Indian lands in violation of-
(1) the prohibition contained in subsection (a) of this section, or
(2) any provision, rule, regulation, ordinance, or permit in effect under State or
local law, or under any other provision of Federal law.
See Brief for Appellee, supra note 159, at 26 (inserting the words "under State or local law,
or" into section 470ee(b)(2)); see also 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(b) (1988) (containing subsection
(b)(2) in its present version).
179. Gerber, 999 F.2d at 1115.
180. Id For other examples of federal statutes affixing penalties to state laws, see
Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (1988); Lindbergh Law, 18 U.S.C. §§ 10, 1201-1202
(1988 & Supp. 1992); and Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951-1957 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
181. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 148, at 8.
182. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896-97 (1984).
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ambiguous statute, a court will consider the statute's legislative history in
hopes of ascertaining the legislature's intent.'" 3 An inquiry into legisla-
tive intent requires an examination of what the statute meant to the
members of Congress who enacted it.' 84 Those groups opposed to
ARPA's applicability to private lands believe that the Seventh Circuit's
interpretation of ARPA in Gerber created a result "fundamentally at
odds" with Congress' intent when enacting the legislation in 1979.185
Congress enacted ARPA in 1979 as a response to the inadequacies of
the Antiquities Act of 1906.186 In the United States House of Represent-
atives, ARPA's sponsor, Representative Udall, tried to emphasize in the
boldest terms possible what ARPA was not intended to do.8 7 Represen-
tative Udall's emphasis on ARPA's applicability solely to public and In-
dian lands is the most detrimental piece of legislative history to advocates
of archaeological resource protection.18 8 It is this language that Gerber
relied upon in construing ARPA's interstate trafficking provision. 8 9
For ARPA to be found applicable to private lands, there must be evi-
dence in the statute's legislative history of a concern for protecting
archaeological resources as a whole, from whatever source derived.
ARPA's enactment came amid the growth of the looting industry and in
the face of potential extinction of the Nation's archaeological re-
sources. 190 Congress was extremely frustrated by the inadequacies of the
Antiquities Act 19' as an enforcement tool against archaeological loot-
183. See id.; United States v. Fairman, 947 F.2d 1479, 1482 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1503 (1992). Today, the weight afforded to legislative history in general is ques-
tionable with a growing trend toward downplaying its importance and looking solely to the
law on its face. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 113 S. Ct. 1562, n.12 (1993) (illustrating the debate
among the Supreme Court Justices regarding legislative history); see also supra note 145
(stating that principles of statutory construction are in a state of flux). But see supra note
37 (discussing when some courts have found it important to consult legislative history).
184. SINGER, supra note 38, § 45.08, at 33.
185. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 148, at 8.
186. As one senator noted, "[tihe drafters of the 1906 act could not have anticipated the
lucrative market in these artifacts." 125 CONG. REc. 21,240 (1979) (statement of Sen.
Hatfield); see also supra notes 133-43 and accompanying text (discussing ARPA's legisla-
tive history).
187. 125 CoNG. REc. 17,393 (statement of Rep. Udall); see supra note 138 and accom-
panying text (discussing Representative Udall's remarks).
188. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (providing Representative Udall's
statements).
189. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 33, at 26.
190. During the course of ARPA's enactment, Representative Udall stated that one of
ARPA's chief objectives is to counter thoughtless entrepreneurs who were "mak[ing] a fast
buck with relatively low risk." 125 CONG. REC. 17,393.
191. See supra notes 42-63 and accompanying text (discussing the inadequacies of the
Antiquities Act).
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ers.19 During congressional debates, the drafters of ARPA indicated a
desire to create an act that would remedy ineffective existing law.'93
Congress was confronted with an archaeological crisis at the time of
ARPA's enactment.' 4 Despite the fact that ARPA's legislative history
repeatedly mentions public and Indian lands, 9 5 the legislative history
also demonstrates that ARPA drafters' general policy objective was to
protect all archaeological resources.'" Hence, the legislative history con-
tains statements supporting both sides of the argument surrounding
ARPA. Whether statements by congressional leaders relating to ARPA's
more general policy objectives 97 would outweigh the continual repetition
of public and Indian lands throughout other congressional statements and
committee reports remains unknown. In support of finding ARPA appli-
cable to private lands, Congress' frequent reference to public and Indian
lands arguably is not attributed to an intent to restrict ARPA solely to
those lands, but merely is illustrative of the fact that the vast majority of
archaeological sites are located on public and Indian lands.' 98 Another
reason that Congress may have repeatedly used public and Indian lands
was to dispel any panic among private property owners who mistakenly
might find ARPA invasive and infiinging on their property rights.
99
192. Senator Hatfield remarked that "[tihe drafters of the 1906 act could not have an-
ticipated ... the use of bulldozers and backhoes in eliminating a piece of history to get a
pot." 125 CONG. REc. 21,240 (statement of Sen. Hatfield).
193. Senator Bumpers stated that "[b]ecause of certain deficiencies in existing law, it
has become evident that new authority is critically needed to insure adequate protection of
these priceless resources." 125 CONG. REc. 21,239 (statement of Sen. Bumpers).
194. See supra notes 42-63, 133-43 and accompanying text (discussing the events lead-
ing up to ARPA's enactment).
195. See supra note 138 (containing the statement of Representative Udall concerning
ARPA's applicability to public and Indian lands).
196. One statement evidencing this policy is that of Representative Pashayan. He re-
marked that "[tihe intent behind this act is to protect unique or one-of-a-kind items in a
true archaeological setting." 125 CONG. REc. 17,395 (statement of Rep. Pashayan).
197. See supra note 196 (discussing ARPA's more general policy objectives).
198. This is the conclusion that Judge Posner reached in rejecting Gerber's arguments
at the appellate level. United States v. Gerber, 999 F.2d 1112, 1115 (7th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 878 (1994). Judge Posner further stated that it would have been "un-
likely" and "parochial" for a Congress generally interested in the protection of archaeo-
logical artifacts to have confined its interests to artifacts removed solely from public and
Indian lands. Id. at 1116.
199. The interests of private property owners are protected under ARPA. To violate
ARPA's interstate trafficking provision, movement through interstate or foreign commerce
in conjunction with a violation of state or local law must occur. See supra notes 154-82
and accompanying text (discussing ARPA's interstate trafficking provision). Arguably, if a
private property owner finds an archaeological resource on his or her property and sells it
in interstate commerce, he or she presumably has not violated ARPA because the requisite
violation of state or local law does not occur.
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4. Does Enforcement Result in a Conflict with Congress' Intent?
Even a facially unambiguous statute may warrant an examination of
the legislative history to determine whether enforcement of the statute
would be contrary to Congress' intent.2 ° ° Thus, assuming that a court
finds ARPA's interstate trafficking provision to be applicable to private
lands,2 ' an obligation to consult ARPA's legislative history remains. The
only legislative evidence favoring ARPA's applicability to private lands
would be the statements that stand for the protection of archaeological
resources, in general.2" Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine that the
drafters who addressed archaeological looting as "a major industry in
crime, 20 3 would condone the notion of a looter escaping ARPA's severe
penalties merely because a looter removed the valuable artifacts from
private lands. Were ARPA's interstate trafficking provision construed as
applicable only to public and Indian lands, it arguably would produce a
result at odds with congressional intent.2°4
D. Incorporating State Law into ARPA: Defining "Any"
Many states have implemented specific archaeological protection
laws.2"' In United States v. Gerber, Gerber challenged ARPA's reference
in its interstate trafficking provision to a violation of "any provision, rule,
regulation, ordinance, or permit in effect under State or local law."20 6 At
the time of Gerber's indictment, no specific archaeological resource pro-
tection laws were in effect in the state of Indiana. 20 7 Therefore, Gerber's
alleged violation of state law fell under Indiana's criminal trespass and
conversion statutes. 20  Gerber challenged that the reference to any spe-
200. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235,242 (1989) (stating that "[tihe
plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the 'rare cases [in which] the
literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the inten-
tions of its drafters'" (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571
(1982))).
201. This is precisely the holding in Gerber. 999 F.2d at 111.6-17.
202. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing ARPA's more general pol-
icy objectives).
203. 125 CONG. REc. 21,240 (1979).
204. See supra note 196 (providing the statement of Representative Pashayan concern-
ing the general intent behind ARPA).
205. See supra notes 86-100 and accompanying text (discussing various state archaeo-
logical protection laws).
206. See 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(c) (1988).
207. Indiana, subsequent to the Gerber violation, enacted the Indiana Historic Preser-
vation Act to combat the problem of archaeological looting within the state. IND. CODE
§§ 14-3-3.4-1 to .4-20 (1993).
208. United States v. Gerber, 999 F.2d 1112, 1113 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
878 (1994); see supra note 128 and accompanying text (providing the text of Indiana's
criminal trespass and conversion statutes).
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cifically referred to those state laws dealing with archaeological resource
protection, thereby placing the trespass and conversion statutes beyond
the scope of the federal statute.2 °9 The Seventh Circuit in Gerber ex-
plained that ARPA "is limited to cases in which the violation of state law
is related to the protection of archaeological sites or objects., 211 Under
this standard, Indiana's trespass and conversion laws sufficiently were re-
lated to the protection of Indian artifacts and other antiquities. 211 There-
fore, violation of these laws fell within the "state and local" law reference
in ARPA's interstate trafficking provision.21 2
Congress has the power to incorporate state laws into federal stat-
utes.21 3 Furthermore, Congress also can incorporate into state law both
the present and future laws of the various states. 214 When incorporation
results from the use of the Commerce Clause, however, a federal statute
is not required to achieve national uniformity among the states.215 In
addition, Congress may refer to state law without incorporating it into the
federal statutory scheme because Congress retains the power to exclude
particular state laws from the incorporative effect of an act.216 Gerber
argued that the standard of incorporation enunciated by the Seventh Cir-
cuit, which requires a state or local law be "related" to the protection of
archaeological sites or resources, is unworkable.217 Yet, according to the
Seventh Circuit, Indiana's laws of trespass and conversion, which include
the objective of protecting Indian artifacts and other antiquities, are suffi-
cient to satisfy the "related" standard.218
In support of the contention that ARPA incorporates "any" state law
and not just state archaeological protection laws, it is helpful to examine
similarly designed statutes. 219 For instance, in the Lacey Act,220 which
209. Gerber, 999 F.2d at 1113.
210. Id. at 1116.
211. Id.
212. Id.; see also supra note 18 (providing the text of the interstate trafficking
provision).
213. United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958). The Court stated that "[w]hether
Congress sets forth the assimilated laws in full or assimilates them by reference, the result
is as definite and as ascertainable as are the state laws themselves." Id. at 293.
214. Id. at 294.
215. See United States v. Morrison, 531 F.2d 1089, 1093 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
837 (1976).
216. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. at 294.
217. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8-10, United States v. Gerber, 999 F.2d 1112 (7th
Cir. 1993) (No. 93-635).
218. United States v. Gerber, 999 F.2d 1112, 1116 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
878 (1994).
219. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 159, at 44.
220. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (1988); see also infra note 221 (providing the text of the
Lacey Act).
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regulates poaching, Congress chose to limit its incorporating language. 221
The Lacey Act explains in its definitional section that its use of " 'law'"
and "'regulation'" expressly refer to those laws specifically protecting
fish and wildlife.222 Unlike the Lacey Act, ARPA's definitional section223
does not limit the incorporation of state law solely to archaeological pro-
tection laws.224 The absence of any limiting language supports the propo-
sition that ARPA incorporates state laws extending beyond local
archaeological protection laws.
E. Dispelling the Void for Vagueness Argument
Gerber also attacked ARPA's interstate trafficking provision as being
void for vagueness225 and therefore violative of his Fifth Amendment due
process rights.226 When examining a statute as potentially void for vague-
ness a court may employ three paths of analysis. First, the court may find
a statute void for vagueness if it does not provide adequate notice of the
prohibited conduct.227 Second, the court may determine whether the
statute permits enforcement that is either arbitrary or discriminatory. 2
Finally, the court may examine whether the statute provides "sufficient
breathing space for First Amendment rights."229 Both the first and sec-
ond types of analysis are implicated in raising a void for vagueness chal-
221. The Lacey Act provides, "[ilt is unlawful for any person ... to import, export,
transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase in interstate or foreign commerce ... any fish
or wildlife taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of any law or regulation of
any State." 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2) (1988). This language is similar to ARPA's interstate
trafficking provision. See supra note 18.
222. The definitional section provides that the terms law and regulation each mean laws
and regulations that "regulate the taking, possession, importation, exportation, transporta-
tion, or sale of fish or wildlife or plants." 16 U.S.C. § 3371(d).
223. See 16 U.S.C. § 470bb (1)-(7) (1988). In this section, the terms archaeological re-
source, Federal land manager, public lands, Indian lands, Indian tribe, person, and State
are defined. Id. The definition of "State" is more general than the definition under the
Lacey Act and does not focus on the reference to state law. Id.
224. See supra note 223 (stating that a specific type of state law is not specified under
ARPA).
225. See Note, supra note 32, at 67 (providing an extensive overview of the void for
vagueness doctrine).
226. Brief for Appellant, supra note 33, at 38. When a statute is challenged as void for
vagueness, the challenger is appealing to "the due process clauses of the Fifth Amendment
(when a federal statute is involved) and the Fourteenth Amendment (when a state statute
is involved)." WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTIN W. ScoTr, JR., CRanrNAL LAW § 2.3, at 90
(2d ed. 1986).
227. See LAFAvE & ScOTr, supra note 226, § 2.3, at 92; see also David W. Gartenstein
& Joseph F. Warganz, Note, RICO's "Pattern" Requirement Void for Vagueness?, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 489, 504-05 (1990) (examining Justice Scalia's implication that RICO's
pattern requirement may be subject to constitutional challenges on grounds of vagueness).
228. See LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 226, § 2.3(a), at 92.
229. Id.
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lenge under ARPA.2 30
One of the principle objectives underlying the void for vagueness doc-
trine is to determine whether a statute provides adequate notice and fair
warning.231 The constitutional standard employed to determine notice is
derived from Connally v. General Construction Co..232 In Connally, the
Supreme Court stated that if "men of common intelligence must neces-
sarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application," a statute will
be declared unconstitutionally vague. 3 Moreover, if a statute regulates
members of a certain trade or business, Congress need only use terms
clear enough for people in that specific trade or business.23
By using the circumstances surrounding Gerber's conviction as an ex-
ample, an analysis of ARPA on its face23 5 seems to indicate that ARPA
applies to private lands. Also, an examination of the circumstances sur-
rounding Gerber's looting seems to indicate that Gerber was on notice as
to this applicability.236 Clearly, the precautions taken by archaeological
looters, including visiting sites at night and disguising themselves with
237 tagovernment uniforms, suggest that archaeological looters are aware of
230. Brief for Appellant, supra note 33, at 39.
231. See id.
232. 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
233. Id. at 391. Other court have adopted this test. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461
U.S. 352, 361 (1983) (finding a California statute, requiring persons who loiter or wander
on the streets to identify themselves and account for their presence to peace officers, un-
constitutionally vague); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 578 (1974) (finding a Massachu-
setts flag-misuse statute void for vagueness); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S.
156, 162 (1972) (finding a Jacksonville vagrancy ordinance void for vagueness); Lanzetta v.
New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 458 (1939) (finding New Jersey's anti-gang statute vague and
indefinite).
234. LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 226, § 2.3, at 92. If Gerber is considered one in the
"trade or business" of archaeological looting, ARPA's terms need only be defined well
enough to enable an archaeological looter to be on notice of the statute. Cf Hygrade
Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 498, 502 (1925) (finding that where the term "ko-
sher" was defined as " 'products sanctioned by the orthodox Hebrew religious require-
ments,' " the definition was sufficiently clear to those in the relevant trade).
235. See supra notes 154-82 and accompanying text (discussing ARPA's interstate traf-
ficking provision on its face).
236. A construction worker on a highway construction site tipped off Gerber as to the
location of the site. United States v. Gerber, 999 F.2d 1112, 1114 (7th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 878 (1994). The property on which Gerber discovered the artifacts was
owned by General Electric. Id. After being notified about the valuable artifacts on the
site, Gerber paid the construction worker for revealing the location of the mound. Id.
During numerous subsequent visits, under cover of darkness, he removed hundreds of arti-
facts from the site. Id. On Gerber's last visit, a General Electric security guard ejected
Gerber. Id. Gerber's conduct is typical of archaeological looters who "sneak into the
ruins, often outfitted with metal detectors and fake government uniforms." Neary, supra
note 8, at 59.
237. Neary, supra note 8, at 59.
[Vol. 44:599
ARPA
the law. Furthermore, Gerber acknowledged that he entered upon pri-
vate property without the owner's permission and, consequently, violated
Indiana's criminal laws of trespass and conversion.238 The components of
ARPA's interstate trafficking provision spell out the requirements of
movement through interstate commerce and a requisite violation of state
or local law.2 39 Gerber's subsequent sale of the artifacts in interstate
commerce 240 and his acknowledgment of the violation of Indiana law 241
placed him in violation of ARPA.
The void for vagueness doctrine is intended to protect those who truly
are not on notice of a statute.242 It is highly doubtful that when the
Supreme Court stated in Grayned v. City of Rockford243 that "[v]ague
laws may trap the innocent,"244 the Court meant to protect archaeologi-
cal looters who likely are well aware of the law and its application. It is
difficult to allow Gerber's void for vagueness challenge to stand because
he clearly committed trespass and conversion.24 5 A typical archaeologi-
cal looter who excavates under the cover of nightfall246 cannot credibly
claim to lack sufficient notice of the language of an archaeological stat-
ute.247 Furthermore, in considering Gerber's challenge, courts will not
treat a void for vagueness challenge favorably when a defendant's con-
duct is particularly inexcusable or the challenge appears to be merely a
pretext for evading a statute.2
238. Gerber, 999 F.2d at 1114.
239. See supra notes 154-82 and accompanying text (discussing ARPA's jurisdictional
basis'and its interstate trafficking provision).
240. Shortly after the excavations, Gerber sold the artifacts at his annual "Indian Relic
Show of Shows" in Kentucky. Gerber, 999 F.2d at 1114.
241. Id
242. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (finding va-
grancy ordinance clearly insufficient to provide people with ordinary intelligence fair no-
tice that their contemplated conduct was forbidden by statute).
243. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
244. Id at 108.
245. Judge Posner emphasized, in the Seventh Circuit's decision, that Gerber's wrong-
doing was a basic illegal act not only under ARPA, but under common law principles as
well. Gerber, 999 F.2d at 1115-16. Judge Posner stated that
there is no right to go upon another person's land, without his permission, to look
for valuable objects buried in the land and take them if you find them ....
Whatever the rightful ownership of the mound and its contents under current
American law, no one suggests that... Gerber obtained any rights to the artifacts
in question.
Id
246. See supra note 236 (describing a typical archaeological looter's excavation).
247. Cf. John Neary, Project Sting, ARCHAEOLOGY, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 52, 52 (recount-
ing sting operations used to catch traffickers).
248. LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 226, § 2.3, at 93.
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III. THE FUTURE OF ARPA: KEEPING IT ALIVE
Archaeological sites are continually targets of unauthorized removal
and excavation, despite efforts by government and tribal agencies. 49
Due to the remarkable commercial value of these archaeological arti-
facts,250 looters are encouraged to circumvent ARPA to receive ever in-
creasing prices for the objects they steal.25' Without strong enforcement
through ARPA, archaeological resources in the United States may be
threatened.
Courts must consistently interpret ARPA as applicable to private lands
for it to be effective. By finding that ARPA's language is vague or inap-
plicable to private lands, a court may sanction archaeological looting only
in some situations. With so many archaeological looting incidents re-
maining undetected, 5 2 a weakened ARPA would be disastrous for the
United States' archaeological preservation objectives.253
The drafters of ARPA sought to clarify the deficiencies of the Antiqui-
ties Act and attempted to be painstakingly clear in drafting ARPA.25 4
While doing so, the drafters did not anticipate every potential problem of
the statute. Although ARPA in its present state may be deemed "worka-
ble," 255 any discrepancies as to the language of ARPA's interstate traf-
ficking provision could render ARPA powerless in certain instances.25 6
In fact, commentators predict that further challenges to ARPA will con-
front the courts.257 To ensure that ARPA remains an effective archaeo-
logical resource protection mechanism, Congress should clarify the
language of the interstate trafficking provision.
249. Hu-rr, supra note 60, at 13.
250. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text (discussing archaeological
devastation).
251. Prices vary for Native American artifacts based upon the geographical location
where they are sold. A Mimbres pot sold near the site may bring anywhere from $200 to
$1,000. See Neary, supra note 8, at 59. If this same pot is sold in Albuquerque, the pot can
demand close to $45,000. Id. The same pot may sell for $95,000 when auctioned off in
New York. Id. In Europe, prices as high as $400,000 for these pots have been reported.
Id.
252. The National Park Service has estimated that reported cases of looting represent
only about a quarter of the actual cases in any particular year. Id. at 58.
253. In response to increased archaeological looting, one archaeologist remarked that
"Itihe really sad thing is that we'll never know what's been taken or how it relates to what
remains in the ground." Arden, supra note 4, at 383.
254. See supra notes 133-43 and accompanying text (discussing ARPA's legislative
history).
255. Hurr, supra note 60, at 51.
256. See United States v. Gerber, 999 F.2d 1112, 1116-17 (7th Cir. 1993) (providing an
analysis of the consequences of Mr. Gerber's construction of ARPA), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 878 (1994).
257. HuTir, supra note 60, at 29.
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Though a congressional amendment expressly including the term pri-
vate lands in the interstate trafficking provision would be an ideal solu-
tion to the problem,25 the most realistic way to clarify ARPA's terms
would be to revise uniform regulations. Currently, federal agencies have
enacted a series of uniform regulations to build upon ARPA.259 Revision
of the uniform regulations to incorporate the term private lands could
remedy any discrepancy as to ARPA's applicability to private lands. Fur-
thermore, any regulation proposed should clarify the type of state and
local law that is incorporated into the interstate trafficking provision.
This regulation should be entitled "ARPA Criminal Provisions." The
language of the regulation, to be effective, must reiterate ARPA's three
prohibited acts provisions. 26° To effectively clarify, the objective of
ARPA, the regulation would have to specify that ARPA's jurisdiction
may be derived from the interstate movement of artifacts taken from any
land, including private lands. 261 Additionally, revised regulations could
dispel any confusion over what type of state law may be incorporated.262
As a result of Gerber, laws "related" to archaeological resource protec-
tion may be incorporated,263 but this interpretation may not make full use
of the broad language of "any" in the statute.26 More specific regulatory
language pinpointing where to draw the line as to incorporation of state
laws may avoid any disagreement as to the language in the interstate traf-
ficking provision.
With the Supreme Court of the United States denying certiorari to the
Gerber case and the Seventh Circuit as the only court to scrutinize
ARPA's interstate trafficking provision,265 ARPA is safe for now. A reg-
ulation addressing the potential deficiencies of ARPA can only serve as a
precautionary measure in ensuring its continued effectiveness. With
258. An amendment to ARPA would most likely not be a priority for Congress. This is
principally because no court has rendered any provisions of ARPA defective and ARPA
was recently amended in 1988.
259. See supra note 74 (listing regulations promulgated under ARPA).
260. See supra notes 18, 155 (providing the text of ARPA's prohibited acts provisions).
261. See supra notes 154-82 and accompanying text (discussing ARPA's interstate
trafficking provision and its jurisdictional basis).
262. See supra notes 205-24 and accompanying text (discussing the incorporation of
state law within ARPA's interstate trafficking provision).
263. United States v. Gerber, 114 S. Ct. 878 (1994).
264. See 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(c) (1988). The Gerber court rejected the notion that a viola-
tion of "any" state law in conjunction with movement through interstate commerce would
cause a violation of ARPA. Gerber, 999 F.2d at 1116. For instance, the Seventh Circuit
reasoned that if an object was obtained lawfully, but its rightful owner failed to pay the
applicable sales tax or an overweight vehicle was used in the transport of the object, no
violations of ARPA's interstate trafficking provision and state law would have occurred.
Id. This poses a problem with respect to defining the boundaries of the word "any."
265. Gerber v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 878 (1994).
15]
Catholic University Law Review
ARPA's statutory language being arguably ambiguous and warranting an
examination of legislative intent, it is tempting for archaeological looters
to challenge ARPA's applicability to private lands in the circuit courts.
As a preventive measure, regulations to ARPA must be revised to better
clarify the scope of the statute.
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted ARPA to compensate for the inadequacies of past
archaeological protection laws. With the Nation's resources being pil-
laged at an increasingly disturbing rate the effectiveness of ARPA is im-
perative. Any detection of ambiguity in the statute only would allow
some looters to avoid ARPA's penalties. Although these instances may
be infrequent, the resources involved in any of these situations could be
priceless to archaeologists, Native Americans, and to the study of our
Nation's heritage. To keep ARPA alive, judicial interpretation must fol-
low the precedent of the Seventh Circuit. ARPA's applicability to private
lands and its incorporation of any state law should be found to be appar-
ent on its face and in light of the statute's legislative history.
To date, the Seventh Circuit is the only court to ponder the meaning of
ARPA's interstate trafficking provision. The Seventh Circuit's decision
upholds the spirit of ARPA and preserves its vitality for the future. If
Gerber's view that ARPA is not applicable to private lands is ever
adopted, the United States will be placing undiscovered, valuable objects
located on private lands in danger. To preserve ARPA, the terms of the
interstate trafficking provision should be clarified.
Stephanie Ann Ades
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